Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand im Auftrag des Osteuropa-Institutes der Universitat FreiburgjSchweiz und wurde in groBziigiger Weise von der Rockefeller Foundation unterstutzt. Ich machte diesen Institutionen hiermit meinen Dank aussprechen; insbesondere aber machte ich dem Herausgeber der Reihe "Sovietica", meinem verehrten Lehrer Prof. Dr. J. M. Bochenski danken, dem ich zahlreiche konkrete Hinweise verdanke. Da uber die marxistisch-Ieninistische Philosophie in der CSR m. W. keine einzige westliche Untersuchung vorliegt - und sei sie noch so bescheiden-, auf eigene Forschung angewiesen. Was allerdings (...) nicht war ich vallig philosophische Fragen betrifft, so konnte ich mich auf zahlreiche Hin weise von Spezialisten stiitzen; in diesem Zusammenhang machte ich mich bei den Herren Dr. H. Dahm von der Redaktion der "Ost-Probleme", Bonn, O. Kostrba yom "Radio Free Europe", Munchen, Dr. Kuhn yom Sudetendeutschen Archiv, Munchen, sowie Dr. R. Urban yom Johann Gottfried Herder-Institut, Marburg, bedanken. Zu besonderem Dank bin ich Dr. H. Slapnicka, Linz, verpfiichtet, von dem ichin wenigen Stunden oft mehr gelernt habe, als ich dureh monate1anges Studium Mtte erfahren kannen. SchlieBlieh machte ieh aueh Herrn O. Sagner von der Buchhandlung Kubon & Sagner, Munchen, danken; seiner oft muhe vollen Sueharbeit verdanke ich fast aIle Zeitschriften und Bucher, die mir zur Verfiigung standen. Der informierte Leser wird vermutlieh zahlreiche Lucken, Ungenauig keiten oder gar Fehler entdecken; ieh muG wohl nieht besonders hervor heben, wie dankbar ieh fUr entsprechende Hinweise bin, die mieh stets uber den Verlag Reidel, Dordrecht, erreichen. (shrink)

Inhalt In memoriam Leonhard G. RICHTER: Traueransprache für Wiebke Schrader. Freitag, 14. Dezember 2007 Martina SCHERBEL: Der Mensch in seiner Mitte. Zum philosophischen Werk Wiebke Schraders Metapher und Wahrheit Georges GOEDERT: Das Tragische als lebensbejahende Metapher ¿ Zu Nietzsches metaphysischer Ästhetik der Geburt der Tragödie Christian FERNANDES: Vergeltung als Metapher für Irrtum und Wahrheit im Buch Ijob Edgar FRÜCHTEL: Nichts als die nackte Wahrheit? Überlegungen zu einer Metaphorologie des Unbegrifflichen Kurt MAGER: Kunst, Dichtung, Schönheit. Zur Ästhetik der Geschichtsschreibung Kant ¿ (...) Aneignung und Kritik Harald SEUBERT: Der ¿sensus communis` in Kants Theorie der Urteilskraft. Zu einem Problem am Rande der Kantischen Kritik und seinen Implikationen Andree HAHMANN: ¿Das Innere und das Äußere¿: Kant als kritischer Erbe der dogmatischen Schulphilosophie Jürgen-Eckardt PLEINES: Die Dike ist die Tochter der Aidos. Scham als ethischer Grundbegriff Metaphysik im Gegenlicht Artur R. BOELDERL: ¿¿ das meiste nämlich / vermag die Geburt¿. Über die Räumlichkeit des Daseins oder: Phänomenologie als Natologie Christian GRAF: Sein, Erscheinung und Existenz. Ontologiekritik als Problem bei Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas und Heinrich Barth Paul JANSSEN: Das menschliche Un-Tier zwischen Wissen und Sinn Buchbesprechungen Bibliographie Wiebke SCHRADER: Philosophische Publikationen Redaktionsnotiz Mitarbeiterliste Redaktion Inhalt der 33 Bände. (shrink)

William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that Levine does (...) not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call sematic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation - as evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance - presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics. (shrink)

Inspired by Bas van Fraassen’s Stance Empiricism, Anjan Chakravartty has developed a pluralistic account of what he calls epistemic stances towards scientific ontology. In this paper, I examine whether Chakravartty’s stance pluralism can exclude epistemic stances that licence pseudo-scientific practices like those found in Scientology. I argue that it cannot. Chakravartty’s stance pluralism is therefore prone to a form of debilitating relativism. I consequently argue that we need (1) some ground or constraint in relation to which epistemic stances can be (...) ranked by degrees, and (2) some way to demarcate science from pseudo-science so that we know what epistemic stances are about. Regarding (1), I argue that empirical detectability can serve as the ground in relation to which epistemic stances are ranked by degrees. Regarding (2), I argue for ranking sciences on a continuum according to established institutional criteria, rather than attempting to draw a strict demarcation. (shrink)

I identify two versions of the scientific anti-realist’s selectionist explanation for the success of science: Bas van Fraassen’s original and K. Brad Wray’s newer interpretation. In Wray’s version, psycho-social factors internal to the scientific community – viz. scientists’ interests, goals, and preferences – explain the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success. I argue that, if Wray’s version were correct, then science should resemble art. In art, the artwork-selection practices that explain artwork-success appear faddish. They are prone to radical change over time. (...) Theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science are however not faddish. They are mostly stable; that is, long-lived and consistent over time. This is because scientists (explicitly or implicitly) subscribe to what I will call the testability norm: scientific theories must make falsifiable claims about the external physical world. The testability norm and not psycho-sociology explains the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science. Contra Wray, scientific anti-realists can then maintain that the external physical world (as expressed in the testability norm) explains theory-success. (shrink)

Several complexity theorists draw a sharp and ontologically robust distinction between (merely) complicated systems and (genuinely) complex systems. I argue that this distinction does not hold. Upon fine-grained analysis, ostensibly complicated systems turn out to be complex systems. The purported boundary between the complicated and the complex appears to be vague rather than sharp. Systems are complex by degrees.

ABSTRACTIn The Netherlands, the public funding of a number of health care services is controversial. What can we learn from this about the moral concerns that underlie these judgements? And, if there is anything to learn, can we use this improved understanding to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions concerning the public funding of health care services? In the present paper, I will analyse three cases: corrective surgey, In Vitro Fertilisation and liver transplantation. I will summarise the arguments that have (...) been used to support or to challenge the public funding of these services. I will then assess the merits of Daniels’fair equality of opportunity account of justice in health care. Can this account improve our understanding of the moral concerns underlying our judgements about the public funding of these services? Can it serve to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions that are made concerning the public funding of health care services? My answer to both questions will be a qualified yes. Daniels’account can provide guidance, but not because we can deductively infer from it what is right and what is wrong. Instead, I will argue for a more casuistic use of the concept of fair equality of opportunity. (shrink)

The concept of meaningful work is used to evaluate the quality of work. Typical cases of meaningless work that have been used to clarify this concept are assembly line work, and work involving other types of mindless tasks, but also David Graeber's ‘bullshit jobs’. I argue that there are at least two fundamental reasons to care about meaningful work: reasons from the wellbeing of the worker and reasons pertaining to meaningfulness of the worker's life. I first argue that a concept (...) of meaningful work needs to reflect these two values, but that these two values may come apart. Because of this, accounts that provide a single answer to the question to what extent a particular work context is meaningful work for a particular worker are unable to reflect these two values. I then survey three promising accounts of meaningful work: perfectionism, which captures the self-interested aspect of meaningful work well but fails to capture the meaningfulness aspect appropriately; consequentialism, which captures the meaningfulness aspect well but fails to capture the self-interested aspect; and Wolf's Fitting Fulfilment View of meaningful projects, which can be read as addressing both concerns but leads to implausible judgments about meaningful work. I then argue that we should conceive of the concerns that fall under the notion of meaningful work as two separate concepts and values. The best work incorporates both these dimensions but falling short on either dimension is problematic for different reasons. (shrink)

Both the concept of a Darwinian tree of life (TOL) and the possibility of its accurate reconstruction have been much criticized. Criticisms mostly revolve around the extensive occurrence of lateral gene transfer (LGT), instances of uptake of complete organisms to become organelles (with the associated subsequent gene transfer to the nucleus), as well as the implications of more subtle aspects of the biological species concept. Here we argue that none of these criticisms are sufficient to abandon the valuable TOL concept (...) and the biological realities it captures. Especially important is the need to conceptually distinguish between organismal trees and gene trees, which necessitates incorporating insights of widely occurring LGT into modern evolutionary theory. We demonstrate that all criticisms, while based on important new findings, do not invalidate the TOL. After considering the implications of these new insights, we find that the contours of evolution are best represented by a TOL. (shrink)

Prima facie, we make successful decisions as we act on and intervene in the world day-to-day. Epistemologists are often concerned with whether rationality is involved in such decision-making practices, and, if so, to what degree. Some, particularly in the post-structuralist tradition, argue that successful decision-making occurs via an existential leap into the unknown rather than via any determinant or criterion such as rationality. I call this view radical voluntarism (RV). Proponents of RV include those who subscribe to a view they (...) call Critical Complexity (CC). In this paper, I argue that CC presents a false dichotomy when it conceives of rationality in Cartesian – i.e. ideal and transcendental – terms, and then concludes that RV is the proper alternative. I then outline a pragmatist rationality informed by recent work in psychology on bounded rationality, ecological rationality, and specifically embodied rationality. Such a pragmatist rationality seems to be compatible with the tenets of post-structuralism, and can therefore replace RV in CC. (shrink)

Paul Cilliers has developed a novel post-structural approach to complexity that has influenced several writers contributing to the current complexity literature. Concomitantly however, Cilliers advocates for modelling complex systems using connectionist neural networks (rather than analytic, rule-based models). In this paper, I argue that it is dilemmic to simultaneously hold these two positions. Cilliers’ post-structural interpretation of complexity states that models of complex systems are always contextual and provisional; there is no exclusive model of complex systems. This sentiment however appears (...) at odds with Cilliers’ promotion of connectionist neural networks as the best way to model complex systems. The lesson is that those who currently follow Cilliers’ post-structural approach to complexity cannot also develop a preferred model of complex systems, and those who currently advocate for some preferred model of complex systems cannot adopt the post-structural approach to complexity without giving up the purported objectivity and/or superiority of their preferred model. (shrink)

This article presents findings from an interview study of human rights practitioners who assist relatives of the disappeared from Chechnya with their complaints before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). These practitioners work for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The study contributes to the scant literature on NGO litigation before the ECtHR and to the social scientific literature on how human rights are actively practiced. It investigates the NGOs’ intermediary position between the ECtHR and the relatives of the disappeared in Chechnya. (...) Consequently, this article asserts that a significant aspect of this position lies in the practitioner’s capacity to mediate between an ambition to externalize local grievances to the ECtHR and the relatives’ hopes that the ECtHR can bring certainty to the uncertain loss of their disappeared relatives. From this position, several dilemmas emerge as to how international legal mechanisms can provide remedies following disappearances. (shrink)